### VAULT:

Verifiable
Audits
Using
Limited
Transparency

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#### Risk-Limiting Audits

- >RLAs should be used in every contest of every election.
- This can be a heavy burden at scale.
- The most efficient RLAs are ballot-comparison audits.


#### The Cast Vote Record Dilemma ...

#### To publish – or not to publish

- If the CVRs are published, voter privacy is compromised (especially where complex ballots are used).
- If the CVRs are not published, why should the public believe the audit?


#### Published Cast Vote Records

Coercion with write-ins



#### Published Cast Vote Records

Coercion with



#### Published CVRs

# Coercion with neither

#### Vote Both Sides OFFICIAL BALLOT FOR ENERAL ELECTION GOWA COUNTY, COLORADO lovember 08, 2016 Precinct KIOWA COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION ounty Clark and Records United States Senato (Vote for One) Deresaldeeks Michael Bennet Board of Director, District 1 nstruction Text: Sease use a black or blue ink pen only. Four Year Term Vote for One Darryl Glenn Completely fill in the box provided to the left of your choice. Make no stray marks on the Lily Tang Williams ballot. Do not use inke that eoak through th Board of Director, Distirct 2 paper. To vote for a write-in candidate, completely fill in the box provided to the le (Signed declaration to limit of the words "Write-in" and write in the nen Terrence L. Riley Am Menconi VARNING: Any person who, by use of force Board of Director, District 3 or other means, unduly influences an eligible Four Year Term Vote for One refrain from voting, or who follooly makes, Delton L. Eikenberg elters, forces, or counterfelts any mell ball before or after it has been cast, or who Dan Chapin Board of Director, At Large a ballot is subject, upon conviction, to Paul Noel Fiorino rprisonment, or to a fine, or both." Marvin Watson Presidential Electors Write-in (Vote for One Pair) Hillary Clinton / Tim Kaine Representative to the 115th United States Congress - District 4 Bob Seay Damell L. Casde / Scott N. Brad Ken Buck Vice Yee or No YES Gary Johnson / Bill Weld Bruce Griffith Jill Stein / Aljemu Berake Write-in Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Frank Atwood / Blake Huber Shall Judge Karen M. Ashby of the Colorad Recent of the University of Colorado At Large (Vote for One) "Rocky" Roque De La Fuente Michael Steinberg YES Alice Madden OM D James Hedges / Bill Bayes Heidi Ganahl Tom Hoefling / Steve Schulin Report of the University of Colorado Vote Yes or No Congressional District 4 (Vote for One) YES Chris Keniston / Deacon Taylor Suzanne M. Sharkey □ NO Alyson Kennedy / Osbome Hart Bob Owens Kyle Kenley Kopitke / Nathan R. Vote Yee or No State Seastor - District 35 Screnson YES Laurence Kollikoff / Edward Larry W. Crowder Learner Kodikoff for President James W. "Jim" Casias Gloria Estela La Riva / Dennis J. Vote Yee or No YES Bradford Lyttle / Hannah Walsh State Representative - District 64 □ NO Joseph Allen Maldonado / Douglas K. Terranova Kimmi Lewis Michael A. Maturen / Juan Mun District Attorney - 15th Judicial District Evan McMullin / Nathan Johns (Vote for One) Joshus Vogel Shall Judge Robert D. Hawthorne of the Ryan Alan Scott / Bruce Kendell Rodney D. Fouracre Vote Yee or No Rod Silva / Richard C. Silva County Commissioner - District 1 □ NO Richard E. Scott Mike Smith / Daniel White County Commissioner - District 3 YES Socialist USA Donald E. Oswald Write-in Vote Both Sides

#### Unpublished Cast Vote Records

- Selected ballots are compared to undisclosed CVRs.
- ➤ Why should someone who can't see the CVR believe that it matches the physical ballot?

Perhaps we can publish commitments to CVRs and then disclose the selected CVRs.

#### Published Commitments to CVRs


➤ Using commitments, we can enable public matching without publishing all CVRs and without compromising voter privacy.

➤ But why should the public believe that the committed CVRs match the announced tallies?


#### SOBA


- Secrecy-Preserving Observable Ballot-Level Audits (2011) Benaloh, Jones, Lazarus, Lindeman, and Stark.
- >CVRs are split into individual contests.
- >A web of interlocking commitments is formed.

#### SOBA



#### SOBA





## SOBA CVR 1: CVR 2: **CVR 3:**

#### The Gap

We need a clear, compelling, and wellunderstood method to

- Commit to CVRs,
- > Allow them to be selectively opened, and
- Demonstrate that the committed CVRs match the announced tallies.

#### End-to-End (E2E) Verifiability

Techniques from E2E-verifiability allow CVRs to be

- encrypted (usually with a key shared by a set of election trustees),
- selectively decrypted (by a quorum of trustees), and
- tallied (without individually decrypting CVRs).

#### Privacy-Enhanced RLAs

What does a privacy-enhanced ballot-comparison audit look like in practice?

The steps match those of an ordinary ballot-comparison audit with two additions.

- 1. Encrypted CVRs are published and proven to match the announced tallies.
- 2. CVRs selected for auditing are decrypted.

#### How are Selected CVRs decrypted?

Many options are available.

- Assemble trustees to decrypt after the audit.
- > Have trustees decrypt during audit.
- Enable a single administrator to decrypt CVRs during the audit.
- ➤ Use a hybrid system.

#### Hybrid System (Marc Rosen)

- Published CVRs are strongly encrypted with a joint public key shared by election trustees.
- Each ballot's encryption nonce is itself encrypted with an administrative key and that encryption is printed directly onto the ballot.

#### IRV and Other Voting Rules

We can also handle IRV and related systems both for privacy-enhanced audits and for E2E-verifiability.

Assertions about the contents of each ballot are encrypted and collectively shown to match the election results.

Read the paper for details. ©

### Questions???